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Abstract
Experimental work on preferences over risk has typically considered choices over
a small number of discrete options, some of which involve no risk. Such experiments
often demonstrate contradictions of standard expected utility theory. We reconsider
this literature with a new preference elicitation device that allows a continuous choice
space over only risky options. Our analysis assumes only that preferences depend on
the probability p and prize x; U = u(p; x): We then allow subjects to choose p and x
continuously on a linear budget constraint, r1p + r2x = m, so that all prospects with
a nonzero expected value are risky. We test ve of the most importantly debated
questions about risk preferences: rationality, prospect theory asymmetry, the indepen-
dence axiom, probability weighting, and constant relative risk aversion. Overall, we
nd that the expected utility model does unexpectedly well.
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Chrisotphe Vargnaud for helpful comments, and Daniel Gelman and Marion Price expert computer pro-
gramming and research assistance. This work was supported by NSF grants SES-0551296 (Andreoni) and
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1 Introduction
Hundreds of theoretical and experimental papers have been written about preferences over
risk. Of the experimental papers, the vast majority study choices over a small, nite
sets of lotteries, one of which is often a sure thing. These papers frequently result in
contradictions of the standard model of expected utility. The most famous of these is the
Allais Paradox (1953). Allais argues (2008, page 4) that in the neighborhood of certainty
the independence axiom breaks down and individuals show a disproportionate preference
for security,while away from certainty the standard model of expected utility should hold.
This has become known as the certainty e¤ect, and is well documented in the literature.
Of equal prominence is prospect theory, both the asymmetry around gains and losses
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), known as loss-aversion, and cumulative prospect theory
summarized by probability weighting (Quiggin 1982, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, Tversky
and Fox, 1995, Prelec, 1998). Measures of loss aversion often come from comparing choices
over discrete sets of gambles that look quite di¤erent. In life, gambles are commonly
continuous (how much savings to put in stocks versus bonds, how fast to drive, how long to
continue search). This leads one to wonder whether presentation complicates the choice task
and invites the use of simplifying heuristics.1 In addition, models of probability weighting are
built from data that elicits an individuals certainty equivalent, that is, the certain amount
that would make a subject indi¤erent to a particular lottery. In light of the certainty e¤ect
of Allais, however, using certainty equivalents builds the certainty e¤ect into the data by
mixing a certain outcome with risky outcomes, and thus may generate misleading conclusions
about choices over only risk.2
We develop a new elicitation method and reconsider the ve key questions that have
dominated the literature on risk preferences. Rather than starting with a particular anomaly
or theory, we assume simply that individuals have some preferences over winning (or losing)
an amount x with probability p, so U = U(p; x):When x is a gain, both p and x are goods,
and most people would prefer higher values for both. When x < 0 is a loss, then p and jxj
are bads,and people prefer less of each. If we were to study preferences for goods and
bads other than risk, we would begin by optimizing a utility function, U(p; x), subject to a
linear budget constraint, say r1p + r2x = m: By changing prices (r1; r2) and income
m, we can learn about the consistency of preferences and the shape of the utility function.3
This is where we begin with our study.
Our approach will allow us to learn about preferences in a new light. Choices are on a
continuum, are simple, and always involve risk. More importantly, we provide strict tests
1This has been argued by Leland (1998,2009) and Rubinstein (1988), for instance.
2See Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b) for a demonstration of the possible bias from using certainty equiv-
alents to measure constant relative risk averse utility.
3This study is distinct from the important prior work of Choi, Fisman, Gale and Kariv (2007). They
x probabilities at, for example, 50-50 chances of winning prize x1 or x2; and allow subjects to allocate the
prizes on a linear budget, q1x1 + q2x2 = m: Their graphical interface program generates fty random
pairs of prices (q1; q2) per subject. Their approach also allows for tests of consistency of preferences. Our
study allows people to make trade-o¤s between higher prizes at lower probabilities, and thus can identify
theories that make assumptions about these trade-o¤s, including the independence axiom, and probability
weighting. Moreover, we consider losses as well as gains, so can address prospect theory asymmetry and loss
aversion.
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that can inform us on ve most important questions on risk, and can falsify expected utility
and its alternatives. First, does a quasi-concave utility function exist that could rationalize
the data? Second is prospect theory asymmetry: is there loss aversion around a reference
point of zero, and are preferences risk averse on gains and risk loving on losses? Third
is the independence axiom (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1944), which is the workhorse
of standard expected utility theory, satised? Fourth is probability weighting, the chief
alternative to the independence axiom, supported? Finally, is an assumption of constant
relative risk averse utility too restrictive to be considered a sensible simplication?
We titled our paper unexpected utilityfor three reasons. First, we began this project
without expectations, but only with a hope of getting refutable statements of core assump-
tions, and more precise estimation of preferences. Second, we do not need to assume
parametric forms of expected utility to test some of its tenetsour maintained hypothesis is
simply utility, not expected utility. This allows a very powerful test of the theory. And
third, we think many people will nd our results unexpectedly supportive of neoclassical
expected utility theory.
Our answers to the ve questions are, rst, that choices over gains are largely consistent
with a model of rational choice where people treat the probability and the prize as goods.
Decisions on losses, by contrast, are much more noisy, perhaps because the decision task over
losses is less familiar. Second, nonparametric tests show a signicant minority of subjects
satisfy the assumptions of prospect theory asymmetry risk aversion on gains and risk loving
on losses. Performing standard parametric analyses on individuals, however, causes the
relationship to weaken, while aggregate analysis retains only loss aversion and not risk loving
on losses. Third, the data are strikingly consistent with the independence axiom, which is
our strongest support for the neoclassical model. By contrast, our data reject probability
weighting, which we speculate is due to the fact that the probability weighting model is
typically t using data that conate preferences over risk with the certainty e¤ect. Finally,
we show that CRRA preferences restrict U(p; x) to be a Cobb-Douglas utility function. We
nd that our data t this restriction with remarkable precision. Overall, our method of
o¤ering choices over a continuum of lotteries, all of which involve risk, yields results that are
unexpectedly consistent with expected utility.
The next section explains how our methodology generates tests of the ve questions.
Section 3 describes the experiment we implement. Section 4 reports the aggregate data,
while sections 5 to 9 present the tests of the ve assumptions. Section 10 is a discussion
and conclusion.
2 Preferences for Risk: The Five Questions
In this section we return to the fundamentals of choice under uncertainty. At each step we
add more structure, and provide a test that could reject the restrictions.
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2.1 Question 1: Are Preferences over Risk Rational?
Consider a lottery that has a probability p of winning x > 0, and wins zero otherwise. Then
the expected value of the gamble is
EV = px
Individuals do not generally maximize EV unless they are indi¤erent to risk. Instead,
assume that people have preferences over combinations of p and x,
U = U(p; x) (1)
where both p and x are goodsand U(p; x) is continuous and quasi-concave. Suppose we
o¤er p and x on a linear budget, say r1p + r2x = m, where r1; r2; and m > 0. That is, to
get a bigger prize, one has to accept a smaller chance of winning it. Then allow a person
the to optimize (1):
max
p;x
U(p; x) (2)
s.t. r1p+ r2x = m
0  p  1; x  0:
We now have our rst and weakest restriction: If preferences are rational and well-behaved,
then (p; x) choices should satisfy the axioms of revealed preference.
If rationality holds, this framework allows nonparametric identication of risk neutrality,
risk aversion, and risk loving behavior, even without invoking the independence axiom. A
risk neutral person would maximize expected value, U(p; x) = px, selecting, say, (pN ; xN).
A risk averse person, by contrast, would prefer a bundle (pA; xA) that, relative to (pN ; xN),
has a higher chance of a lower prize: pA > pN and xA < xN : Conversely, a risk lover prefers
a lower chance of a higher prize, that is (pL; xL) where pL < pN and xL > xN : This is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Suppose instead that x < 0 is a loss. Now p and jxj are both bads. This means a
person will most prefer corner solutions. Choices over most preferred points, therefore, will
not reveal much about preferences. If, however, we were to ask people to minimize utility,
then analysis like that above applies, except that it is inverted. In particular,
min
p;x
U(p; x)
s.t. r1p+ r2jxj = m
0  p  1; x  0
will tend to have an interior solutions as long as U(p; x) is su¢ ciently convex. Choices will
adhere to axioms of choice, but rather than revealing a preference they will be revealing
an aversiveness. Moreover, if (p`N ; x
`
N) characterizes the expected value minimizing gamble
along this budget constraint, then a risk averse utility minimizer will choose p`A > p
`
N and
x`A < x
`
N ; while a risk loving expected utility minimizer would choose p
`
L < p
`
N and x
`
L > x
`
N :
These are summarized in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Maximizing U(p; x) subject to a linear budget r1p + r2x = m, and x > 0: Com-
paring risk averse and risk loving preferences to expected value maximization.
2.2 Question 2: Are Preferences Risk Averse on Gains and Risk
Loving on Losses?
In an extremely inuential body of work, Kahneman and Tversky showed convincingly that
utility is better measured relative to some reference point. In risk, that reference point is
assumed to be no gain or loss. Somewhat more controversial is their conclusion that, while
utility over gains is risk averse, utility over losses is risk loving.4 The graph of utility over
changes in consumption looks S-shaped, with a kink at zero change.
Our methodology will allow us to identify both non-parametrically and parametrically
whether individuals exhibit this asymmetry.
4For example, see Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund (Forthcoming).
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Figure 2: Choices that reveal risk aversion and risk loving behavior for both gains and losses,
without relying on the expected utility framework.
2.3 Question 3: Does the Independence Axiom Hold?
A general utility function like (1) is of limited value without additional structure. The
assumption at the center of expected utility theory is the independence axiom.5 This axiom
implies that the utility an individual experiences from consuming x is independent of the
probability of consuming x: It allows us to write utility as linear in p,
U(p; x) = EU = pu(x) (3)
with u(0) = 0 by assumption.
Solving the optimization problem with expected utility has a powerful and easily testable
prediction. Consider marginal conditions of optimizing (3) subject to r1p+ r2x = m:
pu0(x)
u(x)
=
r2
r1
: (4)
Cross multiply this to get r1pu0(x) = r2u(x): From the budget constraint, substitute out
r1p:
(m  r2x)u0(x) = r2u(x):
5Formally, the independence axiom states that if an agent is indi¤erent between simple lotteries L1 and
L2, the agent is also indi¤erent between L1 mixed with an arbitrary simple lottery L3 with probability p
and L2 mixed with L3 with the same probability p.
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This shows that the solution for x is only a function of r2 and m; x = x(r2;m), and not a
function of r1. That is, sketching o¤er curves as the price of p changes, while r2 and m are
constant, should yield vertical lines. This provides a strict test of the independence axiom.
2.4 Question 4: Does Probability Weighting Hold?
The leading alternative to the independence axiom is probability weighting. The hypothesis
is that individuals behave as if the probability were really transformed by a weighting function
w(p); such that w(0) = 0; w(1) = 1; but w(p) > p for p close 0, and w(p) < p for p close
to 1 with w(p) = p at some intermediate value. If w(p) is di¤erentiable, this means that
w0 > 0 for all p, w0 > 1 for both p near 0 and near 1. An example of a typical probability
weighting function is shown in Figure 3.
1
pT 1
w(p)
0
p
Figure 3: A Typical Probability Weighting function w(p):
The w(p) function was originally derived by Tversky and Fox (1995) by eliciting certainty
equivalents from individuals, assuming a CRRA utility of u = x0:88; and then solving for the
value of w(p) that can justify the certainty equivalents. Given the power of the Allais cer-
tainty e¤ect, it may be problematic to infer preference for risk when one of the options being
compared (the equivalentcertain amount) is not risky.6 It seems reasonable, therefore, to
6See Andreoni and Sprenger (2010c) for detailed arguments on this point, and for a review of the back-
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ask if w(p) takes the same shape when all prospects involve risk.
In our framework, probability weighting means individuals solve
max
p;x
w(p)u(x)
s.t. r1p+ r2x = m;
yielding marginal conditions
w(p)u0(x)
w0(p)u(x)
=
r2
r1
:
What falsiable predictions follow from this solution? Assume that the weighting func-
tion is smooth and di¤erentiable, as shown in Figure 3.7 Of particular importance will be
the p labeled pT in Figure 3. At pT a line from the origin is tangent to the lower edge of
the weighting curve. For p < pT , we know that w(p) > w0(p)p: Thus w(p)=w0(p) > p:
Let (pw; xw; rw1 ) describe a choice on an o¤er curve and relevant price, assuming probability
weighting, for any p < pT : Then
pwu0(xw)
u(xw)
<
w(pw)u0(xw)
w0(pw)u(xw)
=
r2
rw1
:
Rearrange and substitute in the budget to get
(m  r2xw)u0(xw)
u(xw)
< r2 (5)
Next let (pI ; xI ) be the solution at this price assuming the Independence Axiom. Then
(m  r2xI)u0(xI)
u(xI)
= r2: (6)
Let (x) = (m   r2x)u0(x)=u(x): It is trivial to show that 0(x) < 0; as long as u00 < 0:
Combine (5) and (6) to nd that (xw) < (xI), which means xw > xI for all p < pT :
Now consider those p > pT : In this case w(p) < w0(p)p: Thus w(p)=w0(p) < p: Again
let (pw; xw; rw1 ) describe a choice on an o¤er curve and relevant price, assuming probability
weighting, for p > pT : Then
pwu0(xw)
u(xw)
>
w(pw)u0(xw)
w0(pw)u(xw)
=
r2
rw1
:
Applying the same logic as above, we get that (xw) > (xI) and so xw < xI for p > pT :
Similarly, xw = xI for p = pT .
As shown under question 3, the independence axiom implies that xI is the same for all
prices r1. Let r1T be the price at which the o¤er curves under probability weighting and the
independence axiom cross, that is, both demand p = pT . Then these results indicate that
ground literature.
7The same results follow under more general assumptions. For instance, if it is assumed that w(p) is
piecewise linear, but maintains the general property of having a slope greater than 1 at both ends, the same
results easily follow.
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for prices r1 < r1T , that is p > pT , the o¤er curve under probability weighting is to the left
of that under the independence axiom. For prices r1 > r1T , that is p < pT , the o¤er curve
under probability weighting is to the right of that under the independence axiom.
This gives us a clear test of an alternative to the independence axiom. If the probability
weighting holds as in Figure 3, then o¤er curves should slope back, as in Figure 4.
xI
pT
m/r1T
m/r2 x
Offer Curve
Assuming
Probability
Weighting
Offer curve
Assuming the
Independence
Axiom
p
Figure 4: O¤er curves assuming individuals satisfy the Independence Axiom, or adhere to
Probability Weighting
2.5 Question 5: Is CRRA Utility Too Restrictive?
Assuming a functional form for utility is often necessary for analysis. Clearly the most
popular functional form is CRRA:
u(x) = x: (7)
CRRA utility has the clear advantage of being a single-parameter function, so can be
measured o¤of a single observation, as is done in Holt and Laury (2002).8 In our framework,
assuming CRRA utility is the same as assuming that expected utility is Cobb-Douglas:
8See also Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutström (2007). The Holt-Laury method
observes a single crossing point in a series of binary choices that incrementaly change the risk. The crossing
point can be seen as the single observation that identies a narrow interval of values for : Harrison, et al.
improve on this by iterating the method in order to narrow the range of estimates further.
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U(p; x) = px: Maximizing this subject to r1p + r2x = m yields demands of the familiar
Cobb-Douglas utility form:
p(r1;m) =
1
1 + 
m
r1
; x(r2;m) =

1 + 
m
r2
:
As with all Cobb-Douglas demands, the budget shares for each demand (r1p=m and r2x=m)
are constant, and the elasticity of substitution between p and x is constant and equal to
minus one. We can easily test these restrictions with our data.
3 Experimental Protocol
The experiment was conducted in the Economics Laboratory at UCSD in the fall of 2008.
Subjects participated in groups of 20 to 24, with a total of 88 subjects. The experiment
was presented by computer. Each session lasted about 75 minutes and subjects earned an
average of $22.10 (s.d. 3.91).
Subjects were each given $20 as a show up fee, and were told that they could add to this
or lose some or all of it during the study.9 Each subject made choices over 14 budget sets
for gains and 14 for losses. We ran four sessions of the experiment, in two of which subjects
made choices over all the gain budget sets rst, and in two of which they made choices over
all the loss sets rst.10 Within the loss and gains groups, budgets sets were presented in a
random order to each subject. Before making any decisions subjects were told that one of
the budget sets would be selected at random and the gamble they chose from that set would
be resolved with a randomizing device and they would be paid accordingly.
A sample of the decision screen for gains is shown in Figure 5. As can be seen, the
information on probabilities, gains, and the trade-o¤s was presented in three di¤erent ways
on each decision screen. First, on the top of the screen, the budget is explained verbally. In
this example, we state the maximum gain is $20 and each 1 percentage point increase in p will
reduce gains by $0.25, that is (r1; r2;m) = (0:25; 1; 20). Second, as the subject moved the
slider to the right the green pie got larger, indicating a greater likelihood of winning, while
the green bar got shorter, showing a smaller prize. Moving the slider left and right gives
an interactive display of the rate of trade-o¤s between probability and reward. Probabilities
were in presented integer units (44 out of 100 in Figure 5, for instance) while marginal
gains and losses were reported to pennies (for example, $16.67). Third, the bottom of the
screen describes exactly what gamble is highlighted in the circle and bar above. Subjects
are told to select the option they like most.
The decision screen for losses is similar, as seen in Figure 6, however colors switched from
green to red. To further accentuate the di¤erence between gains and losses, the red bar
9The experimental instructions stressed that the $20 endowment was already earned, and that choices
could result in a gain or loss relative to this endowment. Thus, we perform analysis assuming that
subjects care about the gain or loss from their choice rather than relative to some unobserved expectation.
The analysis conrms this as a meaningful approach.
10In a pilot study we completely randomized presentation of the choices between the gain and loss sets.
Feedback from the subjects was that ipping between losses and gains led to mistakes, such as reporting
choices on losses as if they were for gains. We decided at that point to group all of the losses and all of the
gains together. Checking for order e¤ects, we found no signicant di¤erences due to order.
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Figure 5: Decision Screen for Gains
(losses) grows down from zero while the green bar for gains (in Figure 5) grows up from zero.
For each budget set over losses, subjects were told to select the gamble they like least and
that this gamble will denitely not be selected to be played while any of the other possible
gambles were equally likely to be selected, if this were the budget set chosen for payment.
To make the minimization decision more meaningful, we also told subjects that we would
eliminate the gamble they choose plus the two to the left and the two to the right. So in
the example in Figure 6 the subject is choosing 11 out of 100 chance of losing $10.50as
the option preferred least, and is told that we will choose another gamble available on this
page, but excluding those with chances 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 out of 100.
Subjects were presented extensive instructions. These included examples of possible
choices and outcomes, as well as 6 quizquestions that tested their understanding of the
instructions. Subjects could not move forward until all participants answered all quiz
questions correctly. A copy of the instructions can be found in the appendix to this paper,
and a JavaTM applet illustrating the dynamic choice screens can be found on the authors
websites.
We also built in checks to prevent subjects from seeing their choices as part of a portfolio
in which they balanced risks of losses with risks of gains. First, all choice screens were
presented one at a time, and in random order (except that gains and losses were all grouped
together) and subjects did not see a master list of choices. Second, subjects were not
able to go back and forth between budget sets and alter previous choices during the main
part of the experiment. Third, we tested for the presence of portfolio-rebalancing by adding
two more surprise stages. In particular, after completing all 28 decisions we publicly ipped
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Figure 6: Decison Screen for Losses
a coin to determine whether to pay on gains or losses. We then entered stage 2,where
subjects could review all of their choices for the selected set (gains or losses), and make
any revisions they pleased. When stage 2 was complete, we drew a number from 1 to 14
to determine which choice number we would use. This began stage 3 where we allowed
subjects to alter their decision on the chosen budget set. Finally, we rolled two ten-sided
die to determine payo¤s. Since the subjects had no idea stages 2 and 3 were coming, if they
were treating each decision as an independent choice rather than as a portfolio problem,
then we should see no revisions in stages 2 and 3. In the gains domain 42 of the 88 subjects
changed at least one choice between stages one and three. However, the average number
of changes was only 3.43 of 14 possible and the average size of the absolute value of the
changes was only 1.86 percentage points. In the loss domain 35 subjects made changes,
with averages of 2.37 changes and 2.33 percentage points. Seeing only trivial changes, we
discount any rebalancing e¤ects and focus on the stage 1 results in the analysis below.
4 Aggregate Results
Figure 7 (left panel) shows the choice sets o¤ered for gains and the average gamble selected
on each. Selecting x as the numeraire, so r2 = 1; then the set of relative prices, in cents, of
probability is r1 2 f6:25; 8:33; 16:67; 12:5; 25; 50; 100g: The set of normalized incomes is
m 2 f4; 8; 12; 16; 20; 24g. Figure 7 (right panel) shows the same information for losses.
The average choices across subjects is well organized. There are no violations of revealed
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Figure 7: Average choices show no violatations of GARP or GARA
preference for either average gains or losses. Both graphs indicate choices consistent with
downward sloping demands and with treating both p and x as normal goods. While this is
encouraging, it is not particularly meaningful. The next section examines the data at an
individual level and shows how it can be used to test specic hypotheses about risk behavior.
5 Testing Question 1: GARP and GARA
Here we ask whether choices are consistent with some well-behaved preference ordering by
testing adherence to the axioms of revealed preference. We begin with a brief description
of the tests.
5.1 Dening GARP and GARA
A bundle A is directly revealed preferred to a bundle B if B was available when A was
chosen, written APdB. If B is strictly within the budget set, then we say A is strictly
directly revealed preferred to B: Finally, we say a bundle A is revealed preferred to a bundle
Z if there exists a chain of directly revealed preferred comparisons, APdB;BPdC; :::; YPdZ;
connecting A to Z. The axiom to test is GARP:
Denition 1 Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP): If A is re-
vealed preferred to B, then B is never strictly directly revealed preferred to A:
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When we ask our subjects to minimize utility over budgets of bads, as we did with losses,
the revealed aversiveness axioms mirror those of revealed preference.11 Suppose A0; B0; ::::Z 0
are all bads. A bundle A0 is directly revealed more aversive than a bundle B0 if B0 was
available when A0 was chosen as most aversive, written A0AdB0, and A0 strictly directly
revealed more aversive than B0 if B0 was strictly within the budget set when A0 was chosen
most aversive. Finally A0 is revealed more aversive than B0 if there is a chain of direct
comparison such that A0AdB0; B0AdC 0; :::; Y 0AdZ 0:We then apply this test:
Denition 2 Generalized Axiom of Revealed Aversiveness (GARA): If A0 is re-
vealed more aversive than B0, then B0 is never strictly directly revealed more aversive than
A0:
A method devised by Varian (1982) for adding up the violations of revealed preference
is to count the number of budgets involved in one or more violations. Thus, if APdB and
BPdA; then we have a single violation of revealed preference, but two budgets are involved.
Similarly with aversiveness.
If there is a violation of revealed preference or aversiveness, it may be because of a failure
of rationality, or because of errorsin choice. Nonparametric analysis therefore often allows
some tolerance for smallviolations that would still be acceptable under the null hypothesis
of rational choice, just as one might add a random error term to a parametric estimation.
The common tool to measure this is the Afriat Critical Cost E¢ ciency Index (Afriat, 1972),
or CCEI for short. Intuitively, the CCEI measures the fraction of a budget wastedby not
satisfying GARP or GARA. For instance, if CCEI equals 0.80 it means an individual could
have purchased a revealed preferred bundle at 80% of what she actually spent.12 CCEI
equal to 1 means there are no violations of GARP. It is generally accepted that values of the
CCEI above 0.95 should be seen as smallerrors.
5.2 Power of GARP and GARA tests
If subjects fail to violate GARP or GARA, it is natural to ask how powerful the test was
at uncovering irrationality if it were there. First we calculate Bronars(1987) index with a
simulation of 10,000 synthetic subjects, each making random choices from our budgets with
uniform probabilities of each possible choice. These synthetic subjects average 6.58 violations
and an CCEI of 0.803. We also use a bootstrapping test (Andreoni and Harbaugh, 2009)
which samples from the distribution of actual choices over each budget set. This simulation
is designed to incorporate the available information on average preferences into the power
calculation and is therefore di¤erent between losses and gains. The simulation with our
11To our knowledge, this is the rst expression of the notion of Revealed Aversion and the statement of
any axioms in the domain of preferences. Nonetheless, the application to revealed cost minimization is
nearly identical to these ideas and has been extensively developed by Varian (1984).
12The CCEI is 1 minus the proportion by which the budget sets need to be moved towards the origin until
all intransitivities disappear. Specically, for 0 < e  1 we say ARd(e)B if ARd(eB); where Rd refers
to either Pd or Ad. Then nd maximum value of e such that, using Rd(e) rather than Rd; there are no
violations of revealed preference in the data. This e is the CCEI. For more detail on this, see Varian (1982,
1991), and for applications to experimental data see Andreoni and Miller (2002), Harbaugh, Krause, and
Berry (2001), Choi, et al. (2007), or Andreoni (2008).
13
budget sets and the distributions from our sample produce 2.95 GARP violations and an
CCEI of 0.933 over gains, and 6.58 GARA violations and an CCEI of 0.751 over losses. In
short, our subjects had ample opportunity to violate GARP and GARA in this protocol.
5.3 Results
Table 1 lists the actual number of violations of GARP and GARA for our sample for both
gains and losses. Look rst at gains. This data is supportive of a general coherence
with GARP: 57 subjects (65%) have no violations, and 85% of subjects have either 0 or 2
budgets involved in violations of GARP. The data on losses is less encouraging, although still
supportive of rationality for most subjects. Thirty-eight subjects (43%) have no violations,
and 59% have either 0 or 2 budgets in violation of GARA.
Table 1
Revealed Preference Violations for Gains,
and Revealed Aversive Violations for Losses
Number of
Budgets Involved in Gains: Losses:
Revealed Preference GARP GARA
Violations Violations Violations
0 57 32
2 18 14
3 1 9
4 3 7
5 4 3
6 2 6
7 4
8 1 2
9 1
10 1 4
11 3
12 1 1
13 1
14 1
Total 88 88
Table 2 shows a similar pattern on average. For gains, there are 1.284 GARP violations
on average. The average CCEI is 0.976 (s.d. 0.058), which is quite close to 1, with a small
standard deviation, and highly supportive of a model of rational choice. For losses the
average number of budgets in violation of GARA is 3.398, which is more than twice that
of gains. The CCEI for losses averages 0.878 which is below the critical value of 0.95, but
the standard deviation is 0.158, indicating a great deal of variation across individuals. This
implies that the data on gains is far more consistent within subjects than that on losses.
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It is impossible to know whether this is because preferences over losses are less rational, or
whether our protocol on losses asking people to choose their least preferred outcome was
a more di¢ cult or confusing task. Informally, subjects said after the experiment that the
minimization was far more di¢ cult, supporting the latter hypothesis, with some even stating
that, despite the many cues in the protocol, when they switched from gains to losses they
absentmindedly started by maximizing rather than minimizing. Formally, the correlation
of the CCEI on gains with that on losses is  = 0:019; which means there is no tendency for
those who have large violations in gains to also have large violations in losses. This supports
the view that the task on losses was simply more di¢ cult and, as a result, the data is more
noisy on losses.
Table 2
Revealed Preference Violations
and Afriat Critical Cost E¢ ciency Index
by Gain or Loss
Stage 1
Mean St. Dev.
Gains:
Ave GARP Violations: 1.284 2.309
Ave Gain CCEI: 0.976 0.058
Losses:
Ave. GARA Violations: 3.398 3.716
Ave Loss CCEI: 0.878 0.158
*88 observations reported in each row.
Figure 8 illustrates a typical violation in gains (panel A) and losses (panel B), with the
o¤ending choices highlighted in red. Panel C shows the individual with the lowest CCEI in
the sample. This subject appears to be one of those who was mistakenly maximizing for a
few choices rather than minimizing she selected corner solutions on a number of budgets,
and hence generated large violations of GARA.
The problem of individuals maximizing rather than minimizing on losses, as in panel C
above, seems to explain a large fraction of the di¤erence between gains and losses. In gains
there were only three occasions in which a subject chose an allocation with an expected
value of zero, while in losses that number was 80. Such errors also need not violate GARA,
as shown in Figure 9 which plots the choices of subject 57, who does not violate revealed
preferences if we believe the person maximizes utility on gains but minimizes it on losses.
Such an implausible conclusion points to confusion on the task rather than true preferences.
We conclude that choices on gains are consistent with a model of rational choice. The
data on losses is also suggestive of general coherence to rational choice, although there is a
great deal more heterogeneity in violations and a signicant number of subjects who violate
rationality. Our best guess is that this asymmetry is due to the unusual protocol in losses,
that is, asking people to report their least rather than their most preferred choice.
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Figure 8: Examples of Violations of GARP and GARA
6 Testing Question 2: Prospect Theory Asymmetry
Our framework allows three perspectives for examining prospect theory asymmetry. First
is a nonparametric look at risk aversion and risk loving over gains and losses. Second is
a parametric analysis of individual data. Third is parametric analysis on aggregate data.
Our analysis is supportive of prospect theory loss aversion for about one third of individuals.
These individuals have a strong enough inuence on the aggregate data to make risk aversion
on gains and risk loving on losses the best tting model overall. However, when we trim the
sample to exclude choices that are very likely the result of confusion, we nd subjects on
average are only risk neutral on losses.
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Figure 9: Subject 57 who behaves as if maximizing utility on gains while minimizing utility
on losses.
6.1 Individual level: Nonparametric Tests
As shown in Figure 2, a choice is risk averse if x is less than the expected value maximizing
x for gains, and jxj is higher than the expected value minimizing jxj for losses. Here we
calculate the fraction of choices in gains and losses that are risk averse or risk loving. We will
say a person exhibits risk aversion if 50% or more choices are risk averse, and risk loving if
more than 50% are risk loving. Figure 10 plots these proportions for every subject, divided
into the four possible combinations.
Figure 10 reveals that 60.2% of subjects are risk averse on gains, 56.8% are risk loving
in losses, but only 34.1% are both risk averse on gains and risk loving on losses. 26.1% are
risk averse everywhere and 22.7% are risk loving everywhere, while 17% are inexplicable risk
loving on gains and risk averse on losses.
This test shows evidence of the risk preferences proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), with about one third of subjects tting their model of both concave preferences for
gains and convex preferences for losses.13
13Stating an alternative hypothesis in which subjects choose randomly, one would expect about 25% to t
in each of the four quadrants showen in Figure 10 A test of the random assignment to the four typescannot
reject random assignment to the four cells (2[3] = 5:36); hence, although the propect theory type is the
most frequent, the di¤erence from the others is not signicant.
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Figure 10: Revealed Risk Aversion and Risk Loving by Subject
6.2 Individual Level Test: Parametric Analysis
Since there are 14 choices for gains and 14 choices for losses, there are enough observations
to estimate a simple utility function for each subject over each domain. Following the
literature, we estimate the following:14
u(x) =
8<:
x if 1 < x
x if  1  x  1
 ( x) if x <  1
: (8)
The restrictions for risk aversion are that 0 <  < 1; and  > 1: Risk loving follows from
 > 1 and 0   < 1:
We estimate parameters by rst solving for the demand for x. For gains x(m; r2) =
[=(1 + )]m=r2 = am=r2, where a = =(1 + ). We then estimate a by ordinary least
squares (OLS), say a^, solve ^ = a^=(1  a^) and nd the standard error using the delta method.
We proceeded similarly for estimating ^: Results are shown in Figure 11.
Looking rst to gains, we nd that 48.9% of the subjects have values of ^ signicantly
below 1, indicating risk aversion on gains, and only 1 shows signicant risk loving. 47.7%
have  insignicantly di¤erent from 1.
Over losses, we nd 29.5% of subjects with  signicantly below 1 for risk loving, and
again only 1 subject with  signicantly greater than 1 for risk aversion. 67.0% of subjects
14Note the function is linearized for  1  x  1 since the slope of x nears innity as x nears 0.
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(a)G ains
(b)Losses
Figure 11: Estimates and standard errors of (a) ^ and (b) ^ by subject. Dashed lines indicate
1:96 standard deviations from risk neutrality.
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have  insignicantly di¤erent from 1.
Considering gains and losses together, 17% of subjects have prospect-theory preferences
that are signicantly risk averse on gains and risk loving on losses. Only one person is
signicantly risk averse everywhere, and none show risk loving everywhere.
Relative to the nonparametric tests, this parametric analysis decreases the fraction of
subjects with prospect theory loss aversion by half. Nonetheless, it remains the category
that is most prominently supported by signicant coe¢ cients. Because we cannot precisely
estimate preference parameters for such a large fraction of our subjects, however, we are
unable to reject standard assumptions of expected utility for 82% of them.
Table 3
Estimates of Aggregate Utility Function
Full Limited
Sample Sample
Parameter Estimates:
^ 0.738 0.739
(0.040) (0.040)
^ 0.840 1.014
(0.075) (0.074)
F-stats for test of:
^ = ^ 1.8 12.23
(p = 0:18) (p < 0:01)
^ = 1 43.96 43.4
(p < 0:01) (p < 0:01)
^ = 1 4.54 0.03
(p = 0:04) (p = 0:85)
^ = ^ = 1 22.15 22.53
(p < 0:01) (p < 0:01)
Observations 2464 2175
Clusters 88 88
Note: Standard errors clustered at individual in parentheses.
Restricted sample excludes observations with expected value of
zero, which eliminated 3 gains data points and 80 losses.
6.3 Aggregate Data: Parametric Analysis
In this analysis we pool the data and estimate (8) with errors clustered at the individual
level. We conduct our estimates on two di¤erent samples. First, we consider all 88 subjects
in the analysis. Next we try to account for our own failings as experimenters and exclude
the individual choices in which the expected value is zero. The premise for this is that
selecting an expected value of zero would never be the result of optimizing behavior and
thus is likely to be due to confusion within the subject. Of the 2464 observations, this drops
3 observations from gains and 80 from losses.
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The results of these regressions are reported in Table 3. Using the full sample for gains
we nd  = 0:738 and signicant evidence of risk aversion. On losses, we nd  = 0:840, and
signicant evidence of risk loving. Although it lacks statistical signicance (we cannot reject
that ^ = ^), the point estimates indicate there is a kink at 0 gains and losses, with slightly
greater concavity over gains than convexity over losses, as posited by prospect theory.
The limited sample gives a somewhat di¤erent picture. Gains stay largely the same,
while for losses the estimate is  = 1:014 (s.e. 0.074), indicating risk neutrality. This
suggests that the subjects who may have been confused were driving the aggregate estimates
of risk loving in losses. Nonetheless, the analysis resorts the rst order e¤ect of loss aversion,
that is, utility is signicantly steeper in losses.15
7 Testing Questions 3 and 4: The Independence Axiom
vs. Probability Weighting
Figure 12 shows the o¤er curves for the average choices for both gains and losses. To the
naked eye, these curves seem either vertical, which would be consistent with the independence
axiom, or perhaps slightly upward sloping, which would contradict both independence and
probability weighting.16 Next we explore the statistical and economic signicance of possible
deviations from the independence axiom.
7.1 Statistical and Economic Signicance
To test whether the slopes of the o¤er curves deviate signicantly from vertical (innity),
imagine inverting the axes in Figure 12 and asking whether the slope of the o¤er curves
are signicantly di¤erent from zero, with a positive slope being consistent with probability
weighting. To do this, rst normalize the budget constraint so that the x is the numeraire,
that is r0p+x = m0, where r0 = r1=r2 and m0 = m=r2: Then regressing x on the price r0 with
xed e¤ects for m0 can tell us whether the coe¢ cient on r0 is signicantly di¤erent from zero,
and interactions with r0 and the xed e¤ects can tell us whether there is a di¤erence across
15One will note that the estimate of  in this analysis is similar to that found by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2009a,b), who use di¤erent measures but restrict estimation to situations involving only risk, and that the
value of 0.738 is much less extreme risk aversion than found by many other researchers. For instance, in the
auction literature, mention is made of square root utilitywhere   0:5. Holt and Laury (2002) discuss
several relevant willingness to pay results from the auction literature in line with this value. Nonetheless,
this less extreme risk aversion is still concave enough to su¤er from the criticisms of Rabin (2000a). As seen
in the answer to question 2, however, support for reference dependence, one of the solutions envisioned to
Rabins critique (Rabin 2000b), is also suggested in our data.
16With only 11 points across three budgets, it is artful at best to conjecture about individual o¤er curves.
Nonetheless, one sesible criteria on individuals is the following: Look at di¤erences between choices on
adjacent budgets with the same m. Count whether these changes are positive, negative, or zero. Categorize
a change as zero if the two values of x are within 0.5. This accounts for the granularity of choice data. Then
say an o¤er curve is upward (downward) sloping if there are two more upward (downward) changes than
downward (upward). Then for gains we would say there are 21% upward sloping, 1% downward sloping,
and 78% vertical o¤er curves. On losses, the respective percentages would be 26%, 5% and 69%.
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Figure 12: The independence axiom implies o¤er curves are vertical, while probability weight-
ing predicts they slope back.
m0s. These regressions are presented in Table 4 for the 11 budgets that allow this test.17
Table 4 shows a clear rejection of probability weighting and mixed results on the inde-
pendence axiom. Looking just at the e¤ect of r0 combined across all three o¤er curves,
the coe¢ cient is negative and signicant, which contradicts both assumptions. Looking
across o¤er curves for di¤erent incomes, however, only that for m0 = 8 nds a coe¢ cient
signicantly di¤erent from zero on gains, althoughm0 = 8 and 16 nd signicance for losses.
17We also ran identical regressions for the restricted sample as dened in Table 3 above, with very similar
results.
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Table 4
Test of vertical o¤er curves: Fixed e¤ects regression of
prize x on relative price of p, r0 = r1=r2, holding constant real
income m0 = m=r2: A signicant positive slope on price
of p is consistent with probability weighting, while a zero
coe¢ cient is consistent with the independence axiom. z
Gains Gains Losses Losses
r0 = price of p  0:632  1:124
(0:238) (0:371)
(m0 = 8) r0  0:493  0:87
(0:183) (0:309)
(m0 = 16) r0  0:620  1.597
(0:366) (0:695)
(m0 = 24) r0  1:307  0:659
(1:084) (1:705)
m0 = 8 4:111 4:057 4:343 4:246
(0:148) (0:134) (0:200) (0:197)
m0 = 16 7:232 7:226 7:845 8:072
(0:158) (0:208) (0:273) (0:393)
m0 = 24 9:949 10:455 11:314 10:966
(0:301) (0:829) (0:562) (1:401)
Observations 968 968 968 968
Clusters 88 88 88 0:88
zClustered errors in parentheses, bold is p < 0:01, and italic is p < 0:05:
While these coe¢ cients are statistically signicant, perhaps the larger question is are
they economically signicant? What, for instance, does the coe¢ cient of  0:632 mean in
practical terms? Table 5 gives some insight into this question. Here we look at the minimum
and maximum price on each o¤er curve shown in Figure 12, and the associated quantity.
On the m0 = 8 o¤er curve, for instance, price of p decreases by 1100%, and the demand for
x goes up by 18%. While the change in x is statistically signicant, the gross elasticity
is only  =  0:015: Similar results can be seen for m0 of 16 and 24. Thus, while our
measurements are precise enough to nd statistical signicance, it is more challenging to
argue that the deviation from the independence axiom is meaningful in an economic sense.18
18We understand that one could also use this same argument to claim that the economic signicance of
the di¤erence with probability weighting is also not meaningful. We appeal here to Occams razor that
the simpler model should take precidence as the null hypothesis in this test, thus take this data to be more
supportive of the independence axiom than probability weighting.
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Table 5.
Testing the Economic Signicance of imposing the
Independence Axiom on Gains: Absolute change is signicant
for m0 = 8; 16, but Gross Elasticity is economically small.
Real Income, m0 = m=r2 : m0 = 8 m0 = 16 m0 = 24
Real price of p, r1=r2 :
Maximum 1 1 1
Minimum 1/12 1/8 1/2
Percent change 1100% 700% 100%
A. Gains
Mean choice of x :
At maximum price $3.53 $6.83 $9.15
At minimum price $4.22 $7.42 $9.80
Percent change  16%  8%  7%
Comparisons:
Di¤. of mean x, t-test 3.07 1.42 0.97
Gross Elasticity  0:015  0:016  0:067
B. Losses
Mean choice of x :
At maximum price 3.52 6.73 10.31
At minimum price 4.27 8.51 10.64
Percent change -17% -21% -3%
Comparisons:
Di¤. of mean x, t-test 2.10 2.47 0.31
Gross Elasticity -0.016 -0.042 -0.031
Gross Elasticity is dened as (x=x)=(p=p):
This test allows one clear conclusion: there is no evidence to support probability weight-
ing where low probabilities are overweighted and high probabilities underweighted as an
alternative to the independence axiom.19 There is some evidence to suggest that o¤er
curves in Figure 12, while very near vertical, have a signicant positive slopes, in contradic-
tion to the independence axiom. However we would argue that the economic signicance of
this deviation from vertical leaves little room for a theorists creativity to ourish. Stated
di¤erently, the data does not provide a compelling case for rejecting the independence axiom.
8 Testing Assumption 5: CRRA Utility
Since CRRA preferences are typically constructed in the domain of gains, we will restrict our
analysis to the data on gains. Recall, CRRA utility is identical to Cobb-Douglas preferences.
There are two main restrictions that capture Cobb-Douglas preferences, and both are testable
19We also reproduced Table 5 using the restricted sample discussed above. Results for gains are virtually
unchanged, but those for losses become more supportive of the independence axiom. The t-stats all be-
come insignicant (1:39; 1:60; 0:16; respectively) and the gross elasticities are closer to zero by half or more
( 0:008; 0:022; 0:013, respectively)
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with the data. The rst restriction is that demands should have constant budget shares. In
particular r1p=m = 1=(1+) and r2x=m = =(1+): Let sit = r2txt=mt be the budget share
for x by person i on budget t. As above, letm0t = mt=r2 and r
0
t = r1t=r2t: Then the regression
equation sit = o+1m0t+2r
0
t+it should yield values of 1 = 2 = 0 under the null hypothesis
of CRRA preferences. Moreover, the value of 0 should be consistent with the estimate of
^ from the aggregate analysis presented in Table 3, in particular 0 = ^=(1 + ^) = 0:42.
Results of this regression are as predicted. First, ^0 = 0:422, (s:e: = 0:009). Second, the
coe¢ cients ^1 and ^2 on both are very small and extremely precisely estimated: ^1 =  0:003
(s:e: = :0002), and ^2 = 0:094 (s:e: = 0:0013): Although the estimates of both parameters
are signicantly di¤erent from zero statistically, the economic signicance of each point
estimate is small. Doubling the price of p from 1 to 2, for instance, increases the budget
share of x by less than 1 percent.20
A second restriction of Cobb-Douglas is that demands reect a constant elasticity of
substitution, ; and that  =  1: We test this by regressing ln(p=x) on ln(r1=r2). The
coe¢ cient on ln(r1=r2) is our estimate of : Doing so yields an coe¢ cient ^ =  1:063 (s:e: =
0:019). Again, the coe¢ cient is negligibly di¤erent from 1 but is precisely estimated, leading
to a rejection of the hypothesis that  = 1: Still, the estimate of  is likely close enough to
1 to make most economists comfortable with an assumption of CRRA preferences.21
9 Summary and Conclusion
The experimental literature on expected utility and its alternatives has used a variety of
methods and produced a mix of results. Direct measures of preferences or tests of as-
sumptions are often based on discrete choices among a limited set of dissimilar alternatives.
Moreover, one of the alternatives is often a sure thing, which confounds choices over risk with
the Allais certainty e¤ect. Despite hundreds of papers, the literature has failed to cohere
around a single model or measurement tool. We use a new method to measure preferences
that is simple, continuous, and involves only risky choices. Our method allows clear and clean
tests of central questions about the standard model of expected utility and alternatives to it.
The resulting data as a whole is supportive of the model of expected utility, including the
independence axiom, and it rejects some prominent alternatives, such as probability weight-
ing. Aggregate analysis also supports the prospect theory notion of loss aversion around a
reference point of zero gains and losses, but not the assumption of risk loving over losses.
Our method allows subjects to trade-o¤ higher rewards for lower probabilities, by choos-
ing their optimal (p; x) along a downward sloping budget r1p + r2x = m. For losses, they
choose their least favorite options of (p; jxj) along the budget r1p + r2jxj = m. We elicit
choices for each subject from budgets with di¤ering incomes and slopes.
Our analysis starts with the simple assumption that people maximize some general utility
function over the probability and payo¤of a gamble U = U(p; x). We use this method to test
ve key questions on preferences for risk. First, we show choices over gains largely obey the
20This regression included all 88 subjects, however regressions with the limited sample were nearly identical.
To check the robustness of this regression we also added (r0)2 to the regression equation, but the results do
not change the inferences we present here.
21This regression is also for the full sample. For the restricted sample the results are again nearly identical.
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revealed preference axiom of the rational choice model. Losses, by contrast, generate much
noisier behavior, a large part of which is likely attributable to the novelty and complexity
of the choice task on losses as we presented it. Second, the individual data show 1734%
of subjects meet the conditions of prospect theory, by being risk averse on gains and risk
loving on losses. Aggregate analysis also supports the prospect theory notion of loss aversion
around a reference point of zero gains and losses, but not the assumption of risk loving
over losses. Our third and fourth results follow from the observation that demand for x
is largely independent of the price of p. Deviations from this are economically negligible.
This supports the independence axiom and rejects probability weighting, and is perhaps
most striking and important ndings of the paper. Fifth, we show that CRRA utility puts
constraints on choices in our protocol that budget shares should be constant and the elasticity
of substitution could be negative one. Average choices in our data deviate only slightly from
these restrictions.
Overall our results support the standard assumptions of the expected utility when con-
sidering gains, including rationality and risk aversion. When losses are involved, choices are
more noisy and prospect theory loss-aversion is necessary to explain the choices of a signi-
cant minority of subjects. Probability weighting, by contrast, is rejected for both gains and
losses; instead the data favors the independence axiom. Finally, if a researcher would like to
impose the simplication of CRRA utility, this likely comes at a small cost on average.
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